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I. INTRODUCTION
In the case of Annette Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A.,1 the
Eleventh Circuit recently determined that a person who suffers emotional
injury due to a violation of the Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) may obtain damages for her injury. Until 2001,
the law was fairly settled that emotional damages were available for such
violations. But in Barnes v. Gorman2 the Supreme Court departed from
precedent and applied contract law to determine whether punitive
damages are available for violations of acts passed pursuant to the
Spending Clause.3 The Court in Barnes held that punitive damages were
not available as emotional damages and are not generally available when
a party breaches a contract.4 A handful of district courts, including the
Southern District of Florida,5 subsequently held that emotional damages
were not available as compensatory damages for violations of the
Rehabilitation Act6 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.7
This was the first time a circuit court faced this question postBarnes and given the precedential authority this decision is likely to
have, the stakes were enormous. If the Eleventh Circuit had affirmed the
lower court’s decision, denying emotional damages suffered as a result
of a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, victims would have been left
without the ability to seek any redress other than injunctive relief. The
right to relief can be traced as far back as Marbury v. Madison, where
Chief Justice Marshall declared that the “very essence of civil liberty . . .
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
1

Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 2007 WL 3087215, at *18 (11th Cir.
Oct. 24, 2007).
2
536 U.S. 181 (2002).
3
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
4
536 U.S. at 181 (2002).
5
Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network P.A., No. 05-61240-Civ-Cohn (S.D. Fla. June
9, 2006) (on file with author).
6
29 U.S.C. § 701 (2000).
7
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
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laws, whenever he receives an injury.”8 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision
will resonate far beyond victims of Rehabilitation Act violations to
victims of violations of any federal act passed pursuant to the Spending
Clause.9
According to 1990 congressional findings, approximately fortythree million Americans had at least “one or more physical or mental
disabilities.”10 Almost one-half of the total disabled population—24.1
million Americans—was classified as having severe disabilities.11
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA to provide
expansive protection against discrimination for individuals with physical
and mental disabilities in the United States.12 For many of these people,
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are the only legal guarantees that
they will not face discrimination.13 Thus, if the Eleventh Circuit had
8

5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
10
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990).
Congress noted this number was increasing as the population grew older. Id. Statistics
from the Department of Commerce suggest that by 1992 the number of disabled
Americans increased to forty-nine million. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1994, at 137 (114th ed. 1994).
11
LEWIS E. KRAUS, SUSAN STODDARD, & DAVID GILMARTIN, CHARTBOOK ON
DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES, AN INFOUSE REPORT, National Institute on Disability
and Rehabilitation Research (Dep’t of Educ. 1996).
12
Ronda Cress, J. Neil Grindstaff, & S. Elizabeth Malloy, Mental Health Courts and
Title II of the ADA: Accessibility to State Court Systems for Individuals with Mental
Disabilities and the Need for Diversion, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 307, 310 (2006)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)-(c); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)-(b)).
13
Other federal civil rights laws protect the rights of disabled persons in highly
specific circumstances. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, A
Guide to Disability Rights Laws (Sept. 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/cguide.htm.
Federal laws ensure that people with disabilities are not discriminated against: access to
telecommunications, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(a)(2), 255 (2000) (requiring manufacturers of
telecommunications equipment and providers of services to ensure that such equipment
and services are accessible to persons with disabilities); fair housing, see Fair Hous. Act
of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000) (prohibiting housing discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, and national origin); air carriers, see
Air Carrier Access Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in air
transportation by domestic and foreign air carriers against qualified individuals with
physical or mental impairments); voting places, see Voting Accessibility for the Elderly
and Handicapped Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee (2000) (requiring polling places across the
United States to be physically accessible to people with disabilities for federal elections),
and Nat’l Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2000) (requiring all offices of
state-funded programs that are primarily engaged in providing services to persons with
disabilities to provide all program applicants with voter registration forms, to assist them
in completing the forms, and to transmit completed forms to the appropriate state
official); public education, see The Individuals with Disabilities Educ. Act, 20 U.S.C. §
1400 (2000) (requiring public schools to make available to all eligible children with
disabilities a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment
appropriate to their individual needs); building or facilities designed or altered with
9
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affirmed the lower court decision and limited the ability of the disabled
to enforce their rights under these laws, millions of Americans would
have suffered a severe, detrimental impact to their quality of life.
II. THE REHABILITATION ACT AND AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act in 1973 (“the Act”) to
enforce “the policy of the United States that all programs, projects, and
activities receiving assistance . . . be carried out in a manner consistent
with the principles of . . . inclusion, integration, and full participation of
the individuals [with disabilities].”14 To achieve this goal, Congress
enacted section 504 of the Act to prevent “discrimination, exclusion or
denial of benefits to otherwise qualified handicapped individuals by any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”15 It provided,
in pertinent part, that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”16
To ensure that it protected a wide variety of persons, the Act
focused on characteristics likely to lead to discrimination.17 An
“individual with a disability” was any person “who (i) has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person’s major life activities; (ii) has a record of such impairment; or (iii)
is regarded as having such an impairment.”18 Congress also provided
wronged individuals a private right of action against wrongdoers,
“granting [them] the possibility of damages, injunctive relief, and

federal funds, see The Architectural Barriers Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4151 (2000) (requiring that
buildings and facilities that are designed, constructed, or altered with federal funds, or
leased by a federal agency, comply with federal standards for physical accessibility);
mistreatment in state and local institutions of confinement, see The Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2000) (authorizing the U.S. Attorney
General to investigate conditions of confinement at state and local government
institutions such as prisons and jails).
14
29 U.S.C. § 701(c) (2000).
15
S. Rep. No. 93-318, at § 504 (1973), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076,
2143.
16
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
17
According to Sande L. Buhai & Theodore P. Seto, Tax and Disability: Ability to
Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053, 1065 (2006), this approach
marked a new paradigm for disability that broadened the 1935 Social Security Act, which
limited its protections to objects of pity and philanthropy.
18
29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2000), Buhai & Seto, Tax and Disability, supra note 17,
at 1065.
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attorney’s fees, without any requirement that the plaintiff first exhaust
administrative remedies.”19
Section 504 of the Act prohibits recipients of federal funding from
discriminating against disabled persons and requires that programs or
activities operated by a federally-funded entity be readily accessible to
persons with disabilities:20 “[m]oreover, Section 504 prohibits provision
of different or separate assistance to, or retaliation against, people who
assert Section 504 rights.”21 The regulations do not require public
accommodation facilities to alter inventory to include accessible goods
or special goods designed for use by individuals with disabilities.22 Nor
do the regulations require recipients to make every part of a facility or
even all existing facilities accessible to people with disabilities.23 Section
504’s regulations generally require that disabled individuals have equal
opportunities to achieve the same benefits as non-disabled persons.
Although the Act was enacted to protect against discrimination of
disabled individuals solely on the basis of their disability, the Act’s scope
was limited to cover state and local governments that receive federal
funding.24 But many state and local programs, including many state court
systems, do not receive federal assistance. Thus, more expansive
antidiscrimination legislation was needed to protect more fully the rights
of disabled individuals.25
By the early 1990s, Congressional findings indicated that the
Rehabilitation Act was insufficient to protect disabled people from
discrimination. The Congressional findings of fact in section 12101 of
the ADA indicate Congress’ realization that society has a tendency “to
19

Buhai & Seto, Tax and Disability, supra note 17, at 1065.
28 C.F.R. §§ 42.520, 42.521(a) (2006); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability,
Life, Death, and Choice, HARV. J. L. & GENDER 425, 430 (2006) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794
(2004)).
21
Sande Buhai & Nina Golden, Adding Insult to Injury: Discriminatory Intent as a
Prerequisite to Damages Under the ADA, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1121, 1127 (2000) (citing
28 C.F.R. § 42.503(b) (1999)).
22
28 C.F.R. §§ 36.303(a)-(b), 36.307(a).
23
28 C.F.R. §§ 35.150(a), 42.521(a); see also Armen H. Merjian, Bad Decisions
Make Bad Decisions: Davis, Arline, and Improper Application of the Undue Financial
Burden Defense Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
65 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 119 (1999).
24
Ronda Cress, J. Neil Grindstaff, & S. Elizabeth Malloy, Mental Health Courts and
Title II of the ADA: Accessibility to State Court Systems for Individuals with Mental
Disabilities and the Need for Diversion, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 307, 310 (2006)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)-(b) (2000). See also U.S. Dep’t of
Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 606 (1986) (holding that the scope
of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is limited to those who actually “receive” federal
financial assistance).
25
Cress et al., supra note 24, at 310.
20
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isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities” and that such
discrimination “continue[s] to be a serious and pervasive social
problem.”26 According to these findings, society’s actions have relegated
individuals with disabilities to “a position of political powerlessness . . .
resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to,
society . . . .27 The findings further indicated that “the continuing
existence of . . . discrimination and prejudice denies people with
disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis . . . .”28
Congress enacted the ADA in 199029 “to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities . . . .”30 It intended for the ADA to
“be broadly construed to effectuate its purpose.”31 Congress sought to
achieve this by furnishing “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities .
. . .”32
The goal of the ADA is to “provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities.”33 The ADA decrees: “No individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person
who . . . operates a place of public accommodation.”34 The ADA also
extends far beyond private sector employment discrimination, pursuant

26

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000).
See id. § 12101(a)(7).
28
See id.§ 12101(a)(9) (concluding that such discrimination “costs the United States
billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and
nonproductivity”).
29
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)).
30
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
31
Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown, 133 F. Supp. 2d 772, 780 (D.
Md. 2001) (internal citation omitted).
32
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2000).
33
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
34
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Section 202 of the ADA states, in part, that “no individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Thus, while section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against the disabled by recipients of federal
funding, including private organizations, section 202 of the ADA prohibits discrimination
against the disabled by public entities. See also Barnes., 536 U.S. at 236.
27
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to Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Spending
Clause.35
As it had under the Rehabilitation Act, the legislative history of the
ADA indicates that Congress intended to provide wronged individuals
with a private right of action against their wrongdoers, and to grant them
the possibility of damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees, without
any requirement that the plaintiff first exhaust administrative remedies.36
Congress also provided that the remedies for violations of section 202 of
the ADA would be co-extensive with the remedies available for a
violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.37 Thus, as the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision applies to both ADA and Rehabilitation Act cases, it
has wide-ranging implications.

35
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; 42 U.S.C. §
12101(b)(4) (2000). Supreme Court decisions enforcing civil rights in the pre-civil rights
era were often premised on the Spending Clause, rather than on the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Morgan v. Virginia., 328 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1946) (reversing
conviction for violation of a state segregation statute regarding bus transportation based
on the Spending Clause).
36
Cheryl L. Anderson, Damages for Intentional Discrimination by Public Entities
Under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Rose by Any Other Name, but
Are the Remedies the Same?, 9 BYU J. PUB. L. 235, 254 (1995) (concluding that Title II
incorporates an “appropriate relief” remedial standard under which attorney’s fees may
be recovered, but punitive damages may not be). Section 12205 provides for fee-shifting
under the ADA: “In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this
Act, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs, and
the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private individual.” 42
U.S.C. § 12205. However, “[f]ee shifting under the ADA, like other civil rights statutes,
is asymmetric: Fees should be awarded to prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of course, but
prevailing defendants should recover only when forced to litigate claims that are
frivolous, unreasonable, or pursued in bad faith.” Sanglap v. Lasalle Bank, F.S.B., 345
F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Greenier v. Pace, Local No. 1188, 245 F. Supp. 2d
247, 249 (D. Me. 2003) (holding defendant only permitted attorney’s fees under the ADA
where plaintiff’s suit was “totally unfounded, frivolous, or otherwise unreasonable”).
37
See Barnes, 536 U.S at 181. Section 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act declares
that the “remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title [sic] VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 shall be available” for violations of section 504. Id. at 185. Similarly, § 203 of
the ADA declares that violations of § 202 shall have the same “remedies, procedures, and
rights set forth in § 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act.” Id. Thus, the remedies for
violations of all three provisions – § 202 of the ADA, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
and Title VI – are co-extensive.
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III. OVERVIEW OF SHEELY V. MRI RADIOLOGY NETWORK, P.A.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
On June 8, 2005, Annette Sheely went to University MRI to obtain
an MRI for her sixteen-year-old son.38 Ms. Sheely is blind and was
accompanied by her son and her seeing-eye dog.39 When her son’s name
was called, Ms. Sheely rose to go with him, but was told that her seeingeye dog was not permitted outside of the waiting room.40 When Ms.
Sheely inquired as to why she was not permitted to bring her seeing-eye
dog into the examination, the University staff responded with a list of
reasons.41 She was initially told that the restriction would protect her
dog’s safety and increase Ms. Sheely’s comfort.42 The staff then
explained that the restriction would also promote the dog’s comfort.43
Finally, the staff told Ms. Sheely that the metal on the dog’s harness
would interfere with the procedure.44 Her son was then led back for the
MRI without Ms. Sheely present.45
Ms. Sheely’s legal action averred that this incident inflicted
emotional distress on her, claiming it created fear and tension about
going to new places.46 Furthermore, Ms. Sheely asserted that the incident
and resulting anxiety disrupted her ability to sleep.47 Accordingly, Ms.
Sheely sued University MRI for violations of the ADA and section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act.48 In particular, she claimed that University
MRI failed to provide a viable reason for denying a person with a seeingeye dog access to areas in which others similarly-situated with a service
animal would have had access.49 After an initial discovery period,
University MRI moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that
Ms. Sheely did not have standing to sue for declaratory and injunctive
relief, and that emotional damages were not recoverable under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.50

38

Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network P.A., No. 05-61240-Civ-Cohn (S.D. Fla. June
9, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sheely Order].
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Sheely Order, supra note 38, at 2.
45
Id. at 6.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 3.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
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B. The District Court’s Ruling
The district court ruled that Ms. Sheely had standing to sue for
injunctive relief but that emotional distress damages were not available
to a plaintiff under the Rehabilitation Act.51 The court’s analysis began
by noting that the Supreme Court’s holding in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools allowed “all appropriate relief.”52 However, the
court found that the “scope” of “appropriate relief” was subsequently
clarified in Barnes, where punitive damages could not be allowed in a
private suit under the Rehabilitation Act.53 The court recognized that
under Barnes, a Rehabilitation Act suit “is actually a contract-like action
against an entity that fails to provide the contractual service” and that
“only compensatory damages for failing to provide the contractual
obligation are recoverable.”54 The court also relied on Witbeck v. EmbryRiddle Aeronautical Univ., Inc.55 which followed Barnes and denied
claims for mental anguish, damage to reputation, embarrassment and
humiliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The Sheely court stated that the
“Witbeck Court’s analysis of the competing pre-Barnes district court
decisions on this issue of whether emotional distress damages are
available under the Rehabilitation Act remains accurate.”56 The court
relied on Witbeck despite acknowledging that Witbeck erroneously
interpreted Franklin: “[T]he Witbeck decision mistakenly concludes that
the ‘Barnes court found that its decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public School did not apply to Rehabilitation Act causes of action.’”57
C. The Eleventh Circuit’s Ruling
At first blush, the district court’s opinion appears to be correct.
Emotional damages are rarely available in breach of contract cases.58
Consequently, if the contract analogy promulgated in Barnes applies, the
decision seems appropriate. However, when analyzed more closely, the
opinion rests on a series of legal propositions that appear fallacious when
closely analyzed. First, the district court interpreted Barnes as applicable
51

Id. at 13.
Id. at 12 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 at 68 (1992)).
53
Id. at 12 (citing Barnes, 536 U.S at 186-87, 189).
54
Id.
55
269 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
56
Sheely Order, supra note 38, at 13.
57
Id. at 13 (citing Witbeck, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1340 n.1).
58
JOHN E. MURRAY, 1-9 MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 123 (4th ed. 2001). (“Courts
have been particularly reluctant to allow damages for emotional distress in contract
actions.”). See Picogna v. Bd of Educ. of Cherry Hill, 143 N.J. 391, 396-97 (N.J. 1996)
(“[T]he potential for fabricated claims justifies a requirement of enhanced proof to
support an award of such damages.”).
52
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to compensatory damages as well as punitive damages. Further, the
district court concluded that emotional damages are never available for
breach of contract claims. Because both of these propositions
misconstrue or misstate the law, the district court’s decision stood on
questionable legal ground.
On October 24, 2007, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court and held that Sheely could obtain damages for emotional harm that
she suffered.59 The court explained that Barnes utilized contract law as
an analogy to address a concern that federal funding recipients must have
fair notice of any liability they might be subjected to by federal courts.60
The court noted that fair notice was not a concern here; federal funding
recipients are on notice that they might pay emotional distress damages
because emotional distress is a predictable and thus foreseeable
consequence of discrimination.61 The court also held that even if contract
law were directly applicable, emotional distress damages would be
available because federal funding recipients agree not to discriminate and
cause emotional harm when they accept funds. 62 Finally, the court
indicated that emotional damages are a compensatory damage designed
to make “good the wrong done.”63
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S OPINION AND THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT’S REVERSAL
A. The District Court Incorrectly Relied Upon and Interpreted Barnes as
Applicable to Compensatory Damages as well as Punitive Damages
The district court held that emotional damages are barred by
Barnes’s rule that “only compensatory damages for failing to provide the
contractual obligation are recoverable.”64 As explained more fully below,
Barnes addressed only the narrow question of whether punitive damages
are recoverable under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, and did not
consider whether emotional damages are available. In reaching its
conclusion, the district court did not address the body of law–precedent
that Barnes did not disturb–holding that emotional damages may be
recoverable. Nor did the district court fully address Franklin v. Gwinnett

59
Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 2007 WL 3087215, at *18 (11th Cir.
Oct. 24, 2007).
60
Id. at *18.
61
Id. at *19.
62
Id. at *20-21.
63
Id. at *21.
64
See Sheely Order, supra note 38, at 1.

2007]

A Right Without A Remedy

11

County Public School, the case upon which Barnes based its holding,65
which ruled that a plaintiff may recover compensatory damages.66 The
district court’s failure to address Franklin and contrary holdings raised a
number of red flags because damages for emotional distress are more
appropriately considered compensatory damages.
The Eleventh Circuit held that emotional damages are
compensatory damages and they are available to plaintiffs who suffer
emotional distress for intentional violations of the Rehabilitation Act or
the ADA.67 The court of appeals based its decision on the Bell v. Hood
presumption, which the Barnes Court reaffirmed, that “federal courts
may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.”68 The
court was not persuaded by the district court’s opinion. Instead, the
Eleventh Circuit saw “a striking difference” between punitive damages,
which were not compensatory, and emotional damages which “are
plainly a form of compensatory damages designed to “make good the
wrong done.”69 Moreover, the court held that awarding emotional
damages is particularly appropriate where emotional distress is the only
alleged damage and thus the only available remedy to “make good the
wrong done.”70
1. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public School and Its Progeny
Support a Plaintiff’s Right to Recover Emotional Damages
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is in accord with the law that
preceded it. Prior to Franklin, most but not all courts held that money
damages were not recoverable under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.71 The Franklin Court rejected that notion,
65

503 U.S. 60 (1992).
Id.
67
Sheely, 2007 WL 3087215, at *22.
68
Barnes, 536 U.S. at 189 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)).
69
Sheely, 2007 WL 3087215, *21.
70
Id.
71
See, e.g., Eastman v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 939 F.2d 204, 209 (4th
Cir. 1991) (concluding that § 504 permits neither compensatory damages for pain and
suffering nor punitive damages); Rivera Flores v. P.R. Tel. Co., 776 F. Supp. 61, 71 (D.
P.R.1991) (limiting recovery to equitable remedies, thus, employee could not seek
compensatory damages for mental anguish resulting from discrimination), vacated and
remanded by Rivera-Flores v. P.R. Tel. Co., 64 F.3d 742 (1st Cir. 1995); Jenkins v.
Skinner, 771 F. Supp. 133, 136 (E.D.Va.1991) (relying on Eastman and denying recovery
for mental anguish); Ams. Disabled for Accessible Pub. Transp. v. SkyWest Airlines, 762
F. Supp. 320, 325 (D. Utah 1991) (holding damages for emotional distress unavailable);
Rhodes v. Charter Hosp., 730 F. Supp. 1383, 1385-86 (S.D. Miss. 1989) (damages for
emotional distress unavailable); Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 649 F. Supp. 35, 37
(S.D. Fla. 1986) (denying compensatory damages, including for mental suffering or
humiliation, and limiting damages to reinstatement, back pay and attorneys’ fees); Martin
66
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unanimously holding that a plaintiff may recover damages.72 In reaching
this result, the Franklin Court reaffirmed the longstanding rule, stated in
Bell v. Hood that “where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.”73
Thus “if a right of action exists to enforce a federal right and Congress is
silent on the question of remedies, a federal court may order any
appropriate relief.”74 The Court explained that a plaintiff’s entitlement to
any appropriate relief derives from the plaintiff’s power to enforce his
rights:
The power to enforce implies the power to make effective the
right of recovery afforded by the Act. And the power to make the
right of recovery effective implies the power to utilize any of the
procedures or actions normally available to the litigant according
to the exigencies of the particular case.75

Thus, the Court held that unless explicitly instructed by Congress to
do so, courts may not impose any restriction on available remedies:
“[A]bsent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts
have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of
action brought pursuant to a federal statute.”76
Although Franklin is a Title IX case, it also controls both Section
504 and Title VI cases, because Congress intended that the same
remedies be available under Title IX, Title VI and the Rehabilitation
Act.77 Similarly, because Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
v. Cardinal Glennon Mem’l Hosp. for Children, 599 F. Supp. 284, 284 (E.D. Mo. 1984)
(holding damages for humiliation and embarrassment not recoverable); Bradford v. Iron
Co. C-4 Sch. Dist., 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15924, at *25 (E.D. Mo. June 13, 1984)
(damages for humiliation and embarrassment non-recoverable); cf. Kling v. County of
L.A., 769 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 474 U.S. 936 (1985)
(allowing compensatory damages for pain and suffering); Recanzone v. Washoe County
Sch. Dist., 696 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Nev.1988) (same).
72
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
73
327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
74
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 69.
75
Id. at 68 (citations omitted).
76
Id. at 70-71.
77
See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002); see also Waldrop v. S. Co. Serv.
Inc., 24 F.3d 152, 157 n.5 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that section 504 and Title IX were
“virtually identical in the scope of their protections, with the principal exception being
the class protected. Moreover it is well-established that Congress intended the same
remedies be available under Title IX and Title VI. Thus, Franklin establishes that
damages are available in Title VI cases as well as Title IX cases. Similarly, given that
Congress specifically provided that the same remedies be available under section 504 as
are available under Title VI, Franklin must permit damage awards for discrimination
under section 504.”) (internal citation omitted).
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of 199078 incorporates the remedies provisions of the Rehabilitation
Act79 under Title VI, the remedies available under both statutes must be
construed in the same manner.
Thus, a strict application of Franklin permits emotional damages.
In fact, since Franklin, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that
emotional distress damages are recoverable as compensatory damages
under the Act.80 Similarly, many district courts have also found that
compensatory damages for emotional distress are recoverable.81
Not every circuit has had an opportunity to rule specifically on
whether a plaintiff may recover emotional damages. These courts have
held more generally that a plaintiff has unlimited access to the full
panoply of damages under section 504. For example, the Fourth, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits (and arguably the Third Circuit) have ruled that

78

42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2007).
See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2007).
80
See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 572-73 (6th Cir. 1998)
(permitting recovery of compensatory damages for emotional suffering under the ADA);
Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 675 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that such
damages may be recoverable if they are specific or particularized and intentionally
inflicted).
81
See, e.g., De La Cruz v. Guilliani [sic], 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19922, at *31
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002) (compensatory damages for pain and suffering are available
under Title II of the ADA, which employs the same remedial scheme as the Act); Dorsey
v. City of Detroit, 157 F. Supp. 2d 729, 731 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (compensatory damages
for humiliation, emotional distress, and embarrassment are available under Title II of the
ADA); Smith v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 6, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5051, at *18 (D.
Me. Apr. 24, 2001)) (holding that plaintiff could seek compensatory damages for nonpecuniary losses under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act as a result of her
expulsion from a school dance if she could prove evidence of intentional discrimination);
Sumes v. Andres, 938 F. Supp. 9, 13 (D.D.C. 1996) (“[p]laintiff may recover
compensatory damages for humiliation, embarrassment, and emotional pain and
suffering” under the Rehabilitation Act); Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360, 1373
(D. Neb. 1993) (compensatory damages for the feelings of isolation and segregation
experienced by the plaintiff were awarded under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act); Kuntz
v. City of New Haven, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20085, at *6 (D. Conn. June 18, 1993)
(compensatory damages for emotional distress recoverable); Doe v. District of Columbia,
796 F. Supp. 559, 573 (D.D.C. 1992) (court awarded damages for emotional pain
suffered by the section 504 plaintiff); Tanberg v. Weld Co. Sheriff, 787 F. Supp. 970,
972-73 (D. Colo. 1992) (money damages for loss of professional opportunity, mental
anguish, and pain and suffering available under the Act); see also Hopwood v. Tex., 999
F. Supp. 872, 906 (W.D. Tex. 1998), rev’d in part on other grounds, 236 F.3d 256 (5th
Cir. 2000) (“Since Franklin, the strong trend among federal courts is to allow plaintiffs to
recover for mental injuries under Title VI and similar federal anti-discrimination
statutes.”); cf. Saladin v. Turner, 936 F. Supp. 1571, 1583 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (awarding
compensatory damages for emotional distress in an ADA retaliation claim and holding
that punitive damages may be recoverable if employer behaved with reckless
indifference).
79
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plaintiffs may recover the “full spectrum” of damages.82 These courts
could potentially find that compensatory damages for emotional harm
fall within the “full spectrum” of damages.
Only a handful of district court opinions after Franklin have held
that emotional damages are not available, but those cases rely largely on
pre-Franklin cases or fail to consider the Franklin proposition that all
appropriate remedies are presumptively available. In United States v.
Forest Dale, Inc.,83 the court relied on a pre-Franklin case to find that
monetary damages for emotional suffering are not recoverable. The court
found that Section 504 damages were limited to retrospective equitable
damages, ignoring the Franklin presumption that compensatory damages
are available.84 In Pool v. Riverside Health Services, Inc.,85 the plaintiff
suffered humiliation when the hospital staff did not permit her the use of
her service dog within the hospital. The court found that the plaintiff’s
emotional damages could best be remedied by injunctive relief, rather
than by compensatory damages.86 The court relied primarily on preFranklin cases which indicated compensatory damages did not include
recovery for money damages based on mental anguish and emotional
distress.87 Although the court mentioned Franklin, it restricted Franklin’s
application to only those cases involving intentional violations.88 As a
result, the court in Pool limited plaintiff’s remedy to injunctive relief.89
2. Barnes v. Gorman
In addition to ruling that emotional damages are recoverable, many
district courts have also ruled that Franklin’s expansive language to
“order any appropriate relief” permits the recovery of punitive damages
as well as compensatory damages.90 In Gorman v. Easley,91 the Court of
82

Waldrop, 24 F.3d at 157 (“suits under section 504 provide to plaintiffs the full
spectrum of remedies”); Pandazides v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 831 (4th Cir. 1994)
(holding that § 504 provides a “full spectrum” of remedies); Rodgers v. Magnet Cove
Pub. Sch., 34 F.3d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d
Cir. 1995) (citing Franklin’s rule that “courts have the power to award any appropriate
relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute” and therefore
holding that plaintiffs may seek monetary damages under section 504).
83
818 F. Supp. 954, 970 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
84
Id. See also Doe v. Marshall, 882 F. Supp. 1504, 1508 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (noting
that recovery for compensatory and punitive damages for emotional distress is not
available; also relying on Forest Dale without addressing Franklin).
85
No. 94-1430, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12724, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 25, 1995).
86
Id. at *15.
87
Id. at *8.
88
Id. at *14.
89
Id.
90
See, e.g., Kilroy v. Husson Coll., 959 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D. Me. 1997) (“The Court is
persuaded that a private cause of action to enforce the provisions of § 504 exists by
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit overturned a lower court opinion that held
punitive damages were unavailable. Relying on Franklin, the Eighth
Circuit held that punitive damages are appropriate relief because they are
“an integral part of the common law tradition and the judicial arsenal”
and Congress did nothing to disturb this tradition in enacting or
amending the relevant statutes.92
In Barnes v. Gorman, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit.93 The Court recognized that Franklin upheld “the traditional
presumption in favor of any appropriate relief for violation of a federal
right,” but held that the Franklin Court did not describe the scope of
“appropriate relief.”94 To determine whether punitive damages were
within the scope of appropriate relief, the Court turned to principles of
contract law.95 The Court reasoned that contract law was applicable
because under the Spending Clause of the Constitution, Congress has the
power to place conditions on the grant of federal funds, which is
contractual in nature.96 Because the Spending Clause legislation imposes
contractual-type obligations on recipients of federal funds, the Court
reasoned that contract law can also be used to determine which penalties
may be imposed when a party violates the terms underlying acceptance
of these funds.97
Applying contract law, the Court found that punitive damages are
not within the scope of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act because punitive
damages are generally not available for breach of contract.98 The Court
also found that a court should only impose reasonably-implied
contractual terms; that is, those terms that the parties would have agreed
implication and that punitive damages are recoverable under section 504”); Worthington
v. City of New Haven, No. 3:94-CV-00609 (EBB) 1999 WL 958627, at *16 (D. Conn.
Oct. 5, 1999) (“[P]revailing plaintiffs may obtain punitive damages against a private
party for a violation of the ADA or Section 504 . . . .”); Kedra v. Nazareth Hosp., 868 F.
Supp. 733, 740 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (“[P]unitive damages are appropriate for § 504 violations
. . . .”); Proctor v. Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 829-30 (D. Md. 1998)
(holding punitive damages are recoverable under section 504); Fitzgerald v. Green Valley
Area Educ., 589 F. Supp. 1130, 1138 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (interpreting “full panoply” to
encompass punitive damages and holding that, while available, assessment was not
justified under the facts of the case); Patricia N. v. Lemahieu, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1253
(D. Haw. 2001) (refusing to create blanket prohibition on punitive damage awards under
section 504). In allowing punitive damages, these courts overturned previous rulings that
held that redress was limited only to physical injuries.
91
257 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2001).
92
Id. at 745.
93
536 U.S. 181 (2002).
94
Id. at 185.
95
Id. at 187.
96
Id. at 185-86.
97
Id. at 186.
98
Barnes, 536 U.S. at 187.
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to had they adverted to the matters in question.99 The Court’s final
conclusion was that a party who accepts federal aid would not reasonably
expect to be subjected to punitive damages, because “a remedy is
‘appropriate relief’ only if the funding recipient is on notice that, by
accepting federal funding, it exposes itself to liability of that nature.”100
Although Barnes overturned a long line of cases holding that
punitive damages are available, it is not clear that the Court sought to
overturn cases where emotional damages were available. Indeed, the
Court reaffirmed that compensatory damages are available for violations
of the Act.101 In doing so, the Court set no limits on what compensatory
damages are available. Instead, the Court cited favorably to the “well
settled” rule in Franklin that a court can use any available remedy to
“make good the wrong done.”102 Thus, Barnes is silent as to whether
compensatory damages should be narrowly construed to exclude
emotional damages.
3. Barnes’s Progeny Provides Support for a Plaintiff’s Ability to
Obtain Emotional Damages as Compensatory Relief
After Barnes, courts continued to rely on Franklin to hold that
damages are available to compensate plaintiffs under section 504 of the
Act.103 In Ryan v. Shawnee Mission U.S.D. 512,104 the district court
rejected the defendant’s motion to dismiss claims for monetary relief and
compensatory damages for emotional distress. Although the court did
“not definitively resolv[e] the measure of damages applicable to . . . [the]
Rehabilitation Act claim,” the court implicitly disavowed the holding in
Pool that emotional damages could not be recovered.105 The court found
instead that the Ryan plaintiff could recover for emotional distress
damages because he had alleged intentional discrimination.106
In addition, a number of post-Barnes decisions specifically
addressed the issue and ruled that compensatory damages include
recovery for emotional distress. In Norton v. Lakeside Family
99

Id. at 188.
Id. at 187-88 (citation omitted).
101
Id. at 187.
102
Id. at 189 (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66; Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684
(1946)).
103
Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 441 F.3d 1287, 1297 (11th
Cir. 2006) (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65, 75, and noting that money damages are
available for Title IX claims); accord Sauls v. Pierce County Sch. Dist., 399 F.3d 1279,
1283 (11th Cir. 2005) (same).
104
416 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Kan. 2006).
105
Id.
106
Id. at 1097.
100
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Practice,107 the Maine District Court awarded compensatory damages
under the Rehabilitation Act for “loss of enjoyment of life, loss of selfesteem, emotional distress, pain and suffering, and other pecuniary and
non-pecuniary losses.”108 Similarly, in N.T. v. Espanola Public
Schools,109 the New Mexico District Court held that damages for mental
anguish or emotional distress caused by discrimination were available
under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because the statutes function
as a contract for personal well-being that “contemplate[s] damages for
loss of that well-being in the event of a breach.”110 A district court in
Georgia came to an identical conclusion in Ortega v. Bibb County School
District, where the plaintiffs’ disabled child was killed in a school
playground accident.111 The court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to
seek compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act, which would
“necessarily parallel those sought in a wrongful death action.”112
In contrast, the two post-Barnes decisions holding that emotional
damages are not redressable under the Act are not well reasoned, and fail
to consider Franklin’s holding that all appropriate remedies are
presumptively available.113 In Witbeck, the court relied on two preFranklin cases: Rhodes v. Charter Hospital114 and Shuttleworth v.
Broward County115 to find that emotional damages are not available
under the Rehabilitation Act.116 Both cases were no longer good law
when Witbeck was decided because they held that, contrary to Franklin,
compensatory damages are limited to back pay.117 Witbeck also
misinterpreted Barnes (as the Sheely district court acknowledged) when
it found that Barnes held Franklin did not apply to the Rehabilitation
Act.118
107

382 F. Supp. 2d 202, 206 (D. Me. 2005).
Id. at 206.
109
No. Civ 04-0415 MCA/DJS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43667, at *43–44 (D.N.M.
May 20, 2005).
110
Id.
111
Ortega v. Bibb County Sch. Dist., 431 F. Supp. 2d, 1296 (M.D. Ga. 2006).
112
Id.
113
See Witbeck v. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (M.D.
Fla. 2003); Khan v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. (D.N.M. 2003) available at
https://www.nmcourt.fed.us/isys/Q:/ORS/Opinions/BROWNING/03cv00118.1.pdf#xml=
http://10.8.216.2:8844/ISYSquery/IRLE86A.tmp/6/hilite.
114
730 F. Supp. 1383 (S.D. Miss. 1989).
115
649 F. Supp. 35 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
116
269 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
117
Rhodes, 730 F. Supp. at 1386; Shuttleworth, 649 F. Supp. at 37.
118
See Sheely Order, supra note 38, at 13. Specifically, the Witbeck court mistakenly
asserted that “the Barnes Court found that its decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public School did not apply to Rehabilitation Act causes of action.” 269 F. Supp. 2d at
1340, n.1.
108
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Similarly, in the unpublished opinion Khan v. Albuquerque Public
School,119 the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
relied only on Witbeck and pre-Franklin law. Khan cited only two preFranklin cases: Americans Disabled for Accessible Public
Transportation v. SkyWest Airlines120 and Bradford v. Iron County C-4
School District,121 to support the proposition that courts do not award
emotional distress damages for Rehabilitation Act violations. The court
failed to address the post-Franklin decisions holding such damages
recoverable.122
In addition to relying improperly on pre-Franklin cases, both
Witbeck’s and Khan’s contractual analyses were perfunctory. Witbeck
and Khan recognized that compensatory damages are available under
Barnes, but reasoned that because damages for emotional or mental
distress are generally not available for breach of contract, they are also
not available to Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs. Khan mischaracterized
contract law principles by arguing that emotional damages are punitive in
nature and erroneously suggested that contracts for which emotional
distress damages are recoverable must involve “a life or death issue.”123
B. The District Court in Sheely Misapplied Barnes’s Contract Law
Analogy
The district court based its holding in part on the proposition that
Barnes directed courts to look to contract law principles to determine
what remedies are available to victims of intentional discrimination. In
reversing, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court improperly
interpreted Barnes. The court of appeals determined that the “Barnes
Court’s central reason for turning to the contract metaphor appears to be
its concern that federal funding recipients have fair notice of any liability
to which they are subject by federal courts.”124 The court held there was
no such concern here. “We think it fairly obvious—and case law support
this conclusion—that a frequent consequence of discrimination is that the
victim will suffer emotional harm As a result, emotional distress is a
119

Khan v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. (D.N.M. 2003). .
762 F. Supp. 320, (D. Utah 1991).
121
Case No. 82-303-c(4), 1984 WL 1443, at *9 (E.D. Mo. June 13, 1984).
122
A subsequent published decision also from the District Court of New Mexico, held
exactly the opposite. See N.T. v. Espanola Pub. Sch., No. CIV 09-0415 MCA/DJS, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43667, at *43–44 (D.N.M. May 20, 2005) (holding that damages for
mental anguish or emotional distress caused by discrimination were available under the
Rehabilitation Act because the Act functions as a contract for personal well-being that
“contemplate[s] damages for loss of that well-being in the event of a breach . . . .”).
123
Khan, at *11.
124
Sheely, 2007 WL 3087215, supra note 59, at *45.
120
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foreseeable consequence of funding recipients’ ‘breach’ of their
‘contract’ with the federal government.”125
We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that Barnes only meant to apply
contract law as a metaphor. In reasoning that Spending Clause legislation
imposes contractual-type obligations on recipients of federal funds,
Justice Scalia acknowledged that contract law is not conclusive in
addressing all issues arising in Spending Clause cases:
Our decision merely applies a principle expressed and applied
many times before: that the “contractual nature” of Spending
Clause legislation “has implications for our construction of the
scope of available remedies.” We do not imply, for example, that
suits under Spending Clause legislation are suits in contract, or
that contract-law principles apply to all issues that they raise.126

Moreover, the question in Barnes, whether punitive damages are
available, raises issues that are entirely distinct from whether
compensatory damages for emotional or mental distress are available.
Punitive damages are designed to advance overarching social policy
goals, while compensatory damages simply “make good” to a plaintiff
any harms inflicted by a defendant. This difference, ignored by the
district court, was noted by the Barnes Court, which stated that “punitive
damages are not compensatory.”127
Even if the analogy were applicable, Barnes used it to illustrate that
a party who accepts federal aid would not reasonably expect to be
subjected to punitive damages.128 But as the Eleventh Circuit pointed out,
federal funding recipients should reasonably expect to pay damages for
emotional or mental distress because such damages have historically
been awarded in Section 504 cases and in other civil rights contexts.129
125

Id.
Barnes, 536 U.S at 188, n.2 (citation omitted); see also, id. at 186 (“[W]e have
been careful not to imply that all contract-law rules apply to Spending Clause legislation .
. . .”) (emphasis omitted).
127
Id. at 189.
128
Id. at 187-88 (“[a] remedy is ‘appropriate relief’ only if the funding recipient is on
notice that by accepting federal funding it exposes itself to liability of that nature.”)
(emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)).
129
See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (in
context of § 1983 claim, “compensges awarded in § 1983 context); Wright v. Sheppard,
919 F.2d 665, 669 (11th Cir. 1990) (same in § 1982 context); Stallworth v. Shuler, 777
F.2d 1431 (11th Cir. 1985) (damages for emotional distress were recoverable under both
§ 1981 and § 1983); Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 629 F.2d 993, 1005
(5th Cir. 1980) (emotional damages awarded in § atory damages may include not only
out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, but also such injuries as ‘impairment of
reputation . . . , personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.’”); Johnson v.
Hale, 940 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1991) (emotional dama1981 context); Garner v. Giarrusso,
571 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1978) (same).
126
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1. Emotional Damages Are Available for Breach of Contract
Claims
The district court reasoned that if contract law determines the scope
of available remedies, then Sheely would not have the right to recover
damages for emotional injury because emotional damages are not
available for breach of contract.130 However, the court also permitted
Sheely to obtain injunctive relief.131
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court’s presumption that
emotional damages are never attainable when a party breaches a contract,
holding instead that emotional damages are available when the nature of
the contract is such that emotional distress is foreseeable.132 The
Eleventh Circuit explained that the exception allowing emotional
damages is a “notable and longstanding” one, thereby drawing a clear
distinction between the compensatory damages for emotional injuries
that Sheely sought and the punitive damages the Supreme Court refused
to award in Barnes.133 Thus, the court held that even if contract law were
applicable, emotional damages would be available, because “where one
of the benefits the government has bargained for is the funding
recipient’s promise not to discriminate, the recipient cannot claim to lack
fair notice that it may be liable for emotional damages when it
intentionally breaches that promise.”134
We believe that the district court’s holding contradicts principles of
contract law that emphasize how appropriate relief should be available
when contracts are breached. As E. Allan Farnsworth explains: “Our
system of contract remedies is not directed at compulsion of promisors to
prevent breach; it is aimed, instead at relief to promisees to redress
breach.”135 These principles are firm that the injunctive relief, that the
district court ordered is not appropriate. Injunctive relief, or specific
performance, is a disfavored remedy except in rare circumstances, such
as the sale of land, that are not applicable here.136 Damages, which “place
130

Sheely Order, supra note 38, at 12-13.
Id.
Sheely, 2007 WL 3087215, supra note 59, at *20.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 22.
135
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.1 (3d ed. 2004).
136
See RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:1 (4th ed. 1992) (“The
primary if not the only remedy for injuries caused by the nonperformance of most
contracts is an action for a damages for the breach, and except in those rare instances
where only equitable relief is available, as in the case of an oral contract of the sale of an
interest in land that is enforceable only through a decree of specific performance, a
judgment for damages will be given for any breach of any contract.”); JOHN E. MURRAY,
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS §117 (4th ed. 2001) (specific performance is “generally
considered an exceptional remedy”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 135, §12.4 at 162 (“The
131
132
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the injured promisee in the position she would have occupied had the
promise been performed . . . or … restore her [to] the position she was in
before the promise was made,” are preferred.137 The Barnes Court
appeared to endorse this view: “When a federal-funds recipient violates
conditions of Spending Clause legislation, the wrong done is the failure
to provide what the contractual obligation requires; and that wrong is
‘made good’ when the recipient compensates the Federal Government or
a third-party beneficiary (as in this case) for the loss caused by that
failure.”138
Significantly, all of the sources the Barnes Court cited in support of
its contract analysis139 state that emotional damages are available in
certain breach of contract cases where the damages are not incidental to
the breach, but rather where their prevention is the point of the
contract.140
Although the district court is correct that damages for emotional or
mental distress are generally not available for breach of contract,141
emotional damages are available when their prevention is the express
object of the contract, when benefits other than pecuniary benefits are
contracted for, or when they would reasonably or foreseeably result from
the breach.142
common law courts did not generally grant specific relief for breach of contract.”). The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS in section 353 adopts the general rule prohibiting
recovery of non-economic damages in contract cases unless the breach also caused bodily
disturbance or the contract of the breach “is of such a kind that serious emotional
disturbance was particularly likely to result.”
137
MURRAY, supra note 136, at § 117.
138
Barnes, 536 U.S. at 189.
139
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64.7 (1922); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 353 (1981); FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.17 (2001).
140
See, e.g., WILLISTON § 64.7 (“Numerous cases allowing the recovery of emotional
distress damages for breach of contract exist, invariably dealing with what might be
called peculiarly sensitive subject matter, or noncommercial undertakings or both.”).
141
Some courts hold that contract actions for mental anguish are not available. See,
e.g., Keltner v. Washington County, 800 P.2d 752 (Or. 1990).
142
See Huskey v. Nat’l Broad Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (denying
motion to dismiss contract claim alleging emotional damages because breach of a
contract to engage only in consensual filming of prisoners would reasonably be expected
to cause emotional disturbance); Occean v. Marriott Corp., 631 N.E.2d 80 (Mass App. Ct.
1994) (holding emotional harm from breach of an agreement that settled an employment
discrimination claim “was certainly foreseeable”); Decker v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 931
P.2d 436, 448 (Colo. 1997) (allowing recovery of emotional damages for breach of
express covenant of good faith and fair dealing because such damages a “natural and
proximate consequence” of willful breach); See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 353 (1981) (“Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless .
. . the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely
result.”); WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64.7 (1922) (“It has also been stated that where
other than pecuniary benefits are contracted for, damages have been allowed for injury to
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Courts in many states have found that mental distress damages are
recoverable where a contract was of a non-pecuniary nature made “to
secure [the] protection of personal interests.”143 Rather than defining
narrow categorical exceptions, these courts have attempted to “formulate
a broader doctrine, allowing recovery for mental distress resulting from
breach of contract in a wide range of non-tortious breach situations.”144
The contracts at stake have a personal rather than pecuniary purpose, and
that purpose “is utterly frustrated until mental damages are awarded for
the breach.”145
Finally, the district court implicitly recognized that Sheely’s
injuries are cognizable, and that by passing the Rehabilitation Act,
Congress sought to protect disabled people from suffering emotional or
mental distress due to discrimination based on their disability. If this
harm was incidental, these injuries would not be cognizable and the
plaintiffs would not have standing to sue.146
a person’s feelings”); FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.17 (2001) (“Some courts have
looked to the nature of the contract and made exceptions where breach was particularly
likely to result in serious emotional disturbance. Other courts have looked to the nature of
the breach and allowed damages for emotional disturbance on the ground that the breach
of contract was reprehensible. . . .”).
143
See Stanback v. Stanback, 254 S.E.2d 611, 620 (N.C. 1979) (mental damages
recoverable if the contract did not involve trade and commerce, benefits contracted for
non-pecuniary and benefits related “directly to matters of dignity, moral concern or
solicitude”); Stewart v. Rudner, 84 N.W.2d 816, 824-25 (Mich. 1957) (mental damages
recoverable for breach of contract for a Caesarean operation when child died because
contract involved “matters of mental concern and solicitude”); Lamm v. Shingelton, 55
S.E.2d 810, 813 (N.C. 1949) (compensatory damages recoverable for breach of failure to
deliver a watertight casket and to lock the casket because contractual duty “so coupled
with matters of mental concern”); Frewen v. Page, 131 N.E. 475, 476 (Mass. 1921)
(mental distress damages for humiliation recoverable for breach of contract between
innkeeper and guest because contract contained an implied obligation that “neither the
innkeeper or the servant will abuse or insult the guest, or engage in any conduct or speech
which may unreasonably subject him to physical discomfort or distress of mind or
imperil his safety.”); Hill v. Sereneck, 355 So. 2d 1129 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (mental
distress damages recoverable for breach of a home construction contract where breach
affected habitability); Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 8 Cal. App. 3d 844, (Cal. Ct. App.
1970) (mental anguish damages recoverable for breach of contract to have family rings
made into an heirloom). Even state courts generally reluctant to award emotional
damages have found exceptions in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Guerin v. New
Hampshire Catholic Charities, Inc., 418 A.2d 224, 227 (N.H 1980) (mental distress
damages claim viable for eviction from a nursing home). See also, Kewin v. Mass.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980) (finding insurance contracts for
disability income protection did not involve protection of personal interests because
contracts were commercial in nature).
144
Stanback v. Stanback, 254 S.E.2d 611, 618 (N.C. 1979) (citing D. DOBBS,
REMEDIES §12.4, 819).
145
Id.
146
Plaintiffs suffering emotional harm from sexual harassment, as in Franklin, or
from feeling rejected, isolated, and discriminated against because of their HIV status, as
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V. THE RECOVERY OF EMOTIONAL DAMAGES IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE
OPTIMAL DETERRENCE
We believe that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision is not only in
accord with precedent, but also ensures that plaintiffs have the proper
incentive to sue. In passing section 1988 providing for attorneys fees in
eight civil rights statutes, including Title VI and Title IX, “Congress was
aware that ‘[the] effective enforcement of Federal civil rights statutes
depends largely on the efforts of private citizens,’147 and that ‘a vast
majority of the victims of civil rights violations cannot afford legal
counsel [and] are unable to present their cases to the courts.’”148
Providing victims with the proper ability to sue is essential because
victims need “‘private [attorneys] generals advancing the rights of the
public at large, and not merely some narrow parochial interest.”149 Thus,
when Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA,150 it
provided that successful plaintiffs would be able to recover attorney’s
fees.151
Simply providing plaintiffs with injunctive relief does not provide
plaintiffs with the proper incentive to sue. A plaintiff who sues has a
probability, “p” 152 that he will prevail and a probability “1-p” that he
will lose and not collect attorneys’ fees. If a winning plaintiff does not
receive any monetary reward, then the only monetary benefit a plaintiff
receives are attorney’s fees. But in this case, the expected monetary
outcome is less than the fees spent on the attorneys. That is:
Expected monetary outcome = p (attorney’s fees) + (1-p) (0)

= p (attorney’s fees)
< attorney’s fees because p < 1.
in Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F.Supp. 559, 573 (D.D.C. 1992), certainly had
cognizable emotional harm.
147
H. R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1 (1976).
148
Long v. Bonnes, 455 U.S, 961, 967 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1 (1976)) (citation omitted).
149
Long, 455 U.S at 967, (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing 122 CONG. REC. 35122
(1976) (statement of Rep. Drinan)).
150
42 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (2007) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a
violation of a provision of this title [29 USCS §§ 790 et seq.], the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee
as part of the costs.”).
151
42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2007) (“In any action or administrative proceeding
commenced pursuant to this Act, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including
litigation expenses, and costs . . . .”)
152
A plaintiff never has a 100% probability it will prevail, regardless of the merits of
the case. Thus, p < 1.
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Simply put, if a plaintiff receives only injunctive relief, he will not
have the proper incentive to sue.
In mandating that successful plaintiffs recover attorney’s fees,
Congress plainly demonstrated an intention for plaintiffs to have the
proper incentive to sue.153 Thus, only providing for injunctive relief
manifestly contradicts Congressional intent because victims will no
longer be encouraged to enforce their rights and the rights of others
similarly-situated. Accordingly, society will be harmed because many
plaintiffs will not bring legal actions to obtain injunctive relief. The
reduction in suits, including injunctive relief, would eviscerate the Act’s
attempt to deter discrimination and ensure equal treatment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Franklin did not address the
issue of the scope of compensatory damages and looked to Barnes to
determine what is “appropriate.” A central purpose of the implied
contract here is to protect the emotional well-being of persons with
disabilities. A federal recipient’s failure to do so should permit the third
party beneficiary to sue for damages caused by the breach.
Concededly, there is the danger that permitting the recovery of
emotional damages will undermine disability rights. This could occur if
private entities that face severe penalties engage in overly defensive
behavior, such as removing any access currently enjoyed. Private entities
might also decide that the benefits of receiving federal aid do not
outweigh the costs associated with facing suits from plaintiffs claiming
to suffer from emotional damages.
Although we recognize these possibilities, we think they are
unlikely. A plaintiff will only be able to obtain damages if he can prove
he actually suffered emotional harm. We suspect the cost of proving
emotional damages is fairly high, yet the potential recovery is fairly low.
Courts understand that emotional injuries are difficult to assess;
consequently, courts may look to previous discrimination cases granting
damages for emotional distress, try to relate damages to injury, or
exercise discretionary control over the jury’s award.154 Moreover, there is
153
See Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006) (An award of
attorney’s fees is a departure from general practice that the losing party is not required to
reimburse the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees and is “designed as an incentive to
plaintiffs to engage in litigation to vindicate civil rights.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(2006) (providing a fee-shifting provision granting courts the discretion to award
reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in Title IX, Title VI, and six other
statutes).
154
See, e.g., Baumgardner v. HUD, 960 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding $500
award for emotional distress after plaintiff was denied housing because of his gender
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no possibility for punitive damages. Thus, providing for emotional
damages is unlikely to result in a slew of merit-less lawsuits brought by
“ambulance chasing” attorneys. In short, any costs associated with the
possibility of vexatious litigation that may result from the right to sue for
emotional damages does not outweigh the costs associated with the loss
of optimal deterrence that could have occurred if the right to sue for
emotional damages was denied.

where distress was ephemeral); Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1989)
(upholding $75,000 to a victim of false arrest after psychiatrist testified plaintiff suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder); Wade v. Orange County Sheriff’s Office, 844 F.2d
951 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding Title VII plaintiff’s award for $50,000 compensatory
damages for emotional distress where evidence demonstrated plaintiff suffered from
repeated humiliation at work and racially motivated harassment); Portee v. Hastava, 853
F. Supp. 597, 615 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (looking at twenty-one cases since 1988 in which
some form of discrimination resulted in emotional distress where damages ranged from
$500 to $75,000 to support the court’s determination that the jury’s award of $280,000
was excessive); Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Neb. 1993) (awarding ADA
plaintiff $1,000 for her feelings of isolation, segregation and stigmatization after not
being assigned a roommate).

